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Abstract
This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing mod-
els consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our
model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not
only induce incentive eﬀects but also participation eﬀects. We show that contests
that aim to maximize players’ aggregate eﬀort will award their entire prize bud-
get to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that
aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the
winner increases in the contests’ randomness. We also provide empirical evidence
for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we
show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of diﬀering
ability.
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11 Introduction
The world is full of contests. In investment banks, ﬁnancial analysts compete for
promotions; in architectural competitions, architects contend for design contracts; and
in sports contests, athletes compete for prize–money. How many hierarchical levels
should an investment bank implement? How should an architectural competition be
set up? And how should a sports contest distribute its prize–budget across ranks?
A recent literature has provided some answers to these type of questions by consid-
ering the implications of the design of a contest on the players’ incentives to exert eﬀort.
A common assumption in this literature is that the set of players is given exogeneously.
However, as potential participants often have to choose between several contests, the
set of players itself might be inﬂuenced by the contest’s design. For example, an in-
vestment banker may decide to work for bank A rather than bank B because it oﬀers
a steeper hierarchical structure and, in turn, a fast–tracking career. Due to diﬀerences
in contest rules, an architect may be reluctant to devote his time and eﬀort to the
design proposal for the World Trade Center Site Memorial and instead participate in
the design competitions for the London 2012 Olympic Park. Similarly, a marathon
runner may enter the New York Marathon instead of the Chicago Marathon because it
awards a larger fraction of its prize money to suboptimal performances. In this paper
we study optimal contest design when contest designers have to provide contestants
with both, incentives to exert eﬀort and incentives to participate.
Referring to the recent contests for European 3G telecom licenses, Paul Klemperer
(2002) notes that “a key determinant of success of the European telecom auctions was
how well their designs attracted entry [...]”. From the viewpoint of a contest designer,
attracting entry is important. Some contests beneﬁt directly from the participation of
certain key–players or aim to maximize the total number of contestants. For example,
architectural competitions greatly beneﬁt from the mere presence of prominent archi-
tects and big–city marathons boost their media interest by securing the participation
of elite runners.1 Other contests aim to maximize participants’ aggregate eﬀort and
1In 2006 organizers of three major marathons went head to head in their bid for the world record
holder, Paula Radcliﬀe, and the U.S. record holder, Deena Castor (see “Marathons: Top Races are
Vying for the Elite Runners”, International Herald Tribune, June 12, 2006).
2will beneﬁt from entry indirectly through its positive eﬀect on aggregate eﬀort. In this
paper we study optimal contest design from both of these perspectives.
We consider a complete information model in which two contests compete for the
participation of a given set of N ≥ 3 risk–neutral players with linear costs of eﬀort.
Players make their contest choice simultaneously and these choices depend of the con-
tests’ allocation of prizes. Once the set of participants has been determined in each
contest, players exert eﬀort in order to win a prize. The contests’ outcome depends
on both, players’ eﬀorts and the impact of exogenous factors (i.e., the level of ran-
domness). This level of randomness may vary substantially across diﬀerent types of
contest. For example, while randomness plays a small role in a chess competition, it is
the main determinant in a poker tournament. Similarly the outcome of a labour market
tournament might be more random in industries characterized by high volatility, e.g.
the ﬁnanical market.
We begin our analysis by focusing on participation. We show that when organizers
aim to maximize participation, in equilibrium, contests will award multiple identical
prizes. We distinguish between three diﬀerent types of contests: lotteries, where the
contests’ outcome is completely random; all pay auctions, where the contests’ outcome
depends only on eﬀort; and imperfectly discriminating contests that depend on both,
randomness and eﬀort. Our results are very general, i.e. they hold for an arbitrary
number of players, any number of prizes and easily generalize to models with more than
two contests. Overall, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium number of prizes is decreasing in
the contests’ randomness. This implies that contests in which the impact of exogeneous
factors is more important will tend to oﬀer a higher share of their prize budget to the
winner.
Using data from professional road running, we provide empirical evidence for this
relationship. We argue that as the race distance increases, the impact of exogeneous
factors on the race outcome becomes more important.2 We ﬁnd that as the race
distance increases, there is a monotonic increase in the ratio between ﬁrst and second
prize. For example, as the race moves from 5km to 42km, the ratio between the ﬁrst
2While in a 5km race the prediction of the winner based on past performance turns out to be
correct in 43% of the cases, this number reduces to 20% for a marathon. For details see Section 6.
3and the second prize increases by 4 percentage points. We ﬁnd qualitatively similar
results when using alternative measures of competitiveness and after controlling for
various important factors.
When turning our attention to the maximization of players’ aggregate eﬀort, we
ﬁnd that awarding multiple prize rather than a single ﬁrst prize has two eﬀects. It
directly decreases eﬀort for a given set of participants (incentive eﬀect) and it indi-
rectly increases eﬀort through its positive eﬀect on participation (participation eﬀect).
Under the assumptions of our model we show that the incentive eﬀect outweighs the
participation eﬀect. Hence when contest designers aim to maximize players’ aggregate
eﬀort, in equilibrium contests will award their entire prize budget to the winner.
Our theory can provide an explanation for the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in prize struc-
tures observed in reality. Contests that aim to maximize aggregate eﬀort, as it is the
case in science and engineering competitions, are likely to implement the winner–takes–
all principle.3 In contrast, when participation itself is important, for example in sports
contests, multiple prizes will be awarded.
This paper also shows that prize structures might be used to screen players of
diﬀering ability. When players are heterogeneous a contest might want to select the
most able players. We show that high ability players are more likely to enter contests
with steep prize structures than low ability players. This insight is especially important
in labour market settings where ﬁrms aim to attract the most productive workers.
It shows that ﬁrms with steep hierarchies can be expected to have a higher quality
workforce.
This paper is the ﬁrst to model how contests compete for participants. The existing
literature on contest design has focused on single contests with an exogenously given
set of participants. In their seminal paper, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that the
optimal allocation of prizes depends critically on the shape of players’ cost of eﬀort func-
tions. Multiple prizes become optimal when the costs of eﬀort are suﬃciently convex.
Multiple prizes have also been justiﬁed and derived from players’ risk aversion (Krishna
3The NASA 2007 Astronaut Glove Competition awards a single ﬁrst prize of $250000to the designer
of the best performing glove. Similarly, the DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
2005 Grand Challenge awarded $2 million to the fastest driverless car on a 132–mile desert course.
4and Morgan (1998)) and players’ heterogeneity (Szymanski and Valletti (2005)) but
under the restrictive assumption that the number of players is small (N ≤ 4). Other
papers provide arguments for the use of a single (Clark and Riis (1998b), Glazer and
Hassin (1988)) or large (Rosen (2001)) ﬁrst prize or few prizes (Barut and Kovenock
(1998)). In addition, issues considered by this literature include simultaneous versus
sequential designs (Clark and Riis (1998a)), the splitting of a contest into sub–contests
(Moldovanu and Sela (2007)) and optimal seeding in elimination tournaments (Groh
et al. (2008)).
Although some papers endogenize the set of participants, they maintain the focus
on a single contest. Taylor (1995) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999), for example, study
how the set of participants, and hence the expected winning performance, in a research
tournament varies with its entry fee.
Competition for participants has attracted some attention in the literature on auc-
tion and mechanism design. McAfee (1993), Peters and Severinov (1997) and Burguet
and Sakovics (1999) for example, consider models in which auctions compete for bid-
ders. However, while in our model contests compete via their prize allocation, in these
papers, prizes are ﬁxed and auctions compete by using their reservation price. More
related, Moldovanu et al. (2008) consider quantity competition between two auction
sites. Although their model is diﬀerent in its setup it shares a common feature with
ours. In the same way in which in our model contests increase participation by award-
ing multiple prizes (at the cost of undermining incentives), in their model auctions
increase the number of bidders by raising their supply (at the cost of lowering prices).
Finally, the literature on labor tournaments is also relevant here. Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), and Mookherjee (1984)
have shown that the introduction of some form of contest among workers could provide
optimal incentives to exert eﬀort inside a ﬁrm. While Green and Stokey (1983) and
Mookherjee (1984) take the set of workers as exogenously given, Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) assume a competitive labor market in which
each ﬁrm hires a ﬁxed number of workers. While in these papers each worker faces
a ﬁxed number of opponents, our results are driven by the fact that a player’s set of
opponents itself depends on the contest design.
5The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the theoretical model.
Section 3 considers the case where contest designers aim to maximize participation
while Section 4 contains our results about aggregate eﬀort. In Section 5 we consider
the possibility of screening. Section 6 tests the predictions of Section 3 using data on
professional road running. Section 7 concludes. Some proofs and all empirical tables
are contained in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider two contests, i ∈ {1,2}, and N ≥ 3 players. Apart from possible dif-
ferences in the allocation of prizes, contests are homogeneous. We assume that con-
tests face the same budget V . Contests must choose how to distribute their budget
across ranks. In particular, contest i chooses a prize structure, i.e. a vector of non–
negative real numbers vi = (v1
i,v2
i,...,vN
i ) such that vm




i = 1. The m’th prize awarded by contest i has the value vm
i V . Note
that in order to focus on the participation eﬀects implied by a contest’s prize structure
we rule out the possibility that contests pay participants for attendance. Our results
remain valid when we allow for attendance pay (see discussion at the end of Section 3).
It will become clear that the contests’ competition in prize structures resembles price
competition a la Bertrand. As a consequence our results generalize to an arbitrary
number of contests.
In models with a single contest it has been shown that it may be optimal to award
second prizes when players are heterogeneous (Szymanski and Valletti (2005)), risk
averse (Krishna and Morgan (1998)), or have convex costs of eﬀort (Moldovanu and
Sela (2001)). In order to identify competition for participants as the reason for the
emergence of multiple prizes, we instead assume that players are identical, risk neutral,
and have linear costs of eﬀort.4
Each player can participate in, at most, one of the two contests because of time or
other resource constraints. In each contest, participants exert eﬀort in order to win a
prize. A player who enters contest i, exerts eﬀort en ≥ 0, and wins the m’th prize,
4In Section 5 we allow players to diﬀer in their marginal cost of eﬀort.
6receives the payoﬀ Ui
n = vm
i V − Cen.
The parameter C > 0 denotes the players’ constant marginal cost of eﬀort. As-
suming that players have a zero outside option we can normalize, without a loss of
generality, by setting V = C = 1.
The timing is as follows. First, contests simultaneously choose their prize structures.
We denote the subgame, which starts after contests have announced the prize structures
v1 and v2, as the (v1,v2) entry game. Second, players simultaneously decide which
contest to enter.5 Third, players simultaneously choose their eﬀort levels.
In general a contest’s outcome might depend on players’ eﬀorts and on exoge-
nous/random factors. We will use the parameter r to measure the relative importance
of these two factors. For r = ∞ the contests’ outcome is determined entirely by play-
ers’ eﬀorts. In this case, the player with the highest eﬀort wins the ﬁrst prize, the
player with the second highest eﬀort wins the second prize, and so on. For r = 0 the
contests’ outcome is completely random. Here, every player is equally likely to win any
of the prizes irrespective of his eﬀort choice. In order to determine the contests’ out-
come in the intermediate case, 0 < r < ∞, where both, players eﬀorts and exogenous
factors play a role, we employ Tullock’s (1980) widely used contest success function
(see Skaderpas (1996) for axiomatization and Nti (1997) for properties). In particular,
letting Ni denote contest i’s set of participants and Ni its cardinality, prizes in contest






















5While our results remain unchanged when contests are allowed to choose their prize structure
sequentially, the assumption that entry takes place simultaneously is important as it rules out coor-
dination. Note however that when entry is sequential contests have an incentive to conceal the entry
of earlier players from later players. Hence our results remain valid under sequential entry as long as
players cannot communicate with each other.











Note that for 0 < r < ∞ each player wins the contest with positive probability and
this probability is increasing in his own eﬀort and decreasing in the eﬀorts of his rivals.
Also note that the importance of the level of randomness in determining the contests’
outcome is decreasing in r.
As participation is assumed to be costless, players prefer to participate in some
contest rather than to not participate at all. Player n will therefore enter contest 1
with probability qn(v1,v2) ∈ [0,1] and contest 2 with probability 1 − qn(v1,v2). As
players are identical we restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibria of the entry
game, where qn(v1,v2) = q∗(v1,v2) for all players.
While players always choose contests and eﬀort in order to maximize their expected
payoﬀ, with respect to the contest organizers we will distinguish between two objec-
tives. In Section 3 we consider the case where organizers aim to maximize expected
participation, while in Section 4 we turn out attention to the maximization of expected
aggregate eﬀort.
3 Participation
Contests need to attract participants, without participants there is no contest. Partici-
pation increases (aggregate) incentives and often raises contests’ revenues directly. For
example, the design proposal of a famous architect, once realized, will attract tourists
to the building/city that staged the architectural contest. Similarly sports contests will
yield higher media revenues if they are able to secure the participation of star athletes.
From a more theoretical perspective, the incentive eﬀects of a prize structure for
a given set of players have been well understood. However, the participation eﬀects
of a prize structure when the set of players is endogeneous have not been considered
so far. In this section we therefore concentrate on participation by assuming that
contest organizers set prize structures in order to maximize the expected number of
8participants. In particular, contest 1 chooses v1 to maximize Nq∗(v1,v2), while contest
2 chooses v2 to maximize N(1 − q∗(v1,v2)).
The probability q∗(v1,v2) with which players enter contest 1 in equilibrium will be
derived as follows. We ﬁrst consider the eﬀort choice for all players n ∈ Ni participating
in contest i given the prize structure vi. This allows us to determine a player’s expected
payoﬀ in contest i conditional on contest i having Ni participants, E[Ui
n|Ni]. Next,
assuming that all players enter contest 1 with the same probability q, we can then






























n] = 0. (6)
The rest of this section derives the equilibrium prize structure for diﬀerent contest
forms. We begin by looking at the two extreme cases where the contests’ outcome
are completely random or determined entirely by players’ eﬀorts. We end the section
by allowing for both eﬀort and randomness to aﬀect the contests’ outcome. The main
insight of this section is that a decrease in the contests’ randomness leads to an increase
in the number of prizes awarded in equilibrium and to a decrease in the share awarded
to the winner.
3.1 Lotteries: r = 0
We start by considering the extreme case, r = 0, where the contests’ outcome is





average of the m highest prizes. In contest i each player n ∈ Ni is equally likely to
win any of the prizes v1
i,...,v
Ni




i will remain unawarded. Hence in equilibrium all players will exert zero




n|Ni] = ¯ vi(Ni) (7)
for all n ∈ Ni. Our ﬁrst result characterizes the players’ equilibrium contest choice for
r = 0.
Lemma 1 Consider the case r = 0. If vi  = ( 1
N, 1
N,..., 1
N) for some i ∈ {1,2} then
the (v1,v2) entry game has a unique symmetric equilibrium q∗(v1,v2). The expected
number of participants in contest i is strictly larger than in contest j if and only if















N)  = v2 then ∆
is strictly decreasing in q with ∆(0) = v1
1 − 1
N > 0 and ∆(1) = 1
N − v1
2 < 0. Hence
∆(q∗) = 0 deﬁnes a unique symmetric equilibrium q∗ ∈ (0,1). Moreover, q∗ > (<) 1
2 if
and only if ∆(
1






N)  = v2 then ∆(
1
2) < 0 and q∗ = 0 while
for v1  = ( 1
N, 1
N,..., 1
N) = v2 it holds that ∆(1
2) > 0 and q∗ = 1.
To understand the intuition for this result consider the following example. Suppose
that contest 1 has a more competitive prize structure than contest 2, in the sense that it
concentrates a larger fraction of its prize budget towards low ranks, i.e. ¯ v1(m) ≥ ¯ v2(m)
for all m ∈ {1,2...,N} with strict inequality for some m. Hence P 0(v1) > P 0(v2)
and Lemma 1 implies that the more competitive contest expects a higher number of
participants. Players prefer the more competitive prize structure as it maximizes the
prize money that will be shared (equally) when the number of participants turns out to
be small. Note that this result depends crucially on the fact that players are assumed
to be risk neutral. The immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that contests have an
incentive to choose a more competitive prize structure than their rival. Hence we get
the following result:
Proposition 1 Consider the case r = 0. In equilibrium both contests award their
entire prize budget to the winner, i.e. v1 = v2 = (1,0,...,0).
10Proof: The prize structure v∗ that maximizes P 0(v) is unique and v∗ = (1,0,...,0).
Hence Lemma 1 implies that in equilibrium v1 = v2 = v∗ and both contests expect the
same number of participants, i.e. q∗(v1,v2) =
1
2.
The idea is that, in the same way as ﬁrms undercut each others prices in order to
increase the demand for their goods, contests try to take participants from each other
by choosing competitive prize structures. The resulting Bertrand style competition
leads to “winner–takes–all” contests. Note that the existence of several contests is
crucial for this result. In a model with a single contest, players would be completely
indiﬀerent with respect to diﬀerent prize structures and expect a payoﬀ of
1
N.
One example where extremely competitive prize structures are observed in reality
are investment banks’ promotional contests. A recent review of ﬁnancial packages at
Wall Street approximated that the average entry level annual payments to an analysts
was $150,000 while a top Managing Director could receive as much as $8 million (in-
cluding bonuses), making the “top prize” more than 53 times the “lowest prize”.6 It is
often argued that a ﬁnancial analyst’s career path in an investment bank’s promotional
contest is marked by uncertainty. For example, Nassim Taleb (2005), a legend amongst
option traders, states that “[...] one can make money in the ﬁnancial market totally
out of randomness.” So far the literature on contest design has explained the steep
hierarchies found in the ﬁnancial industry by referring to the ﬁrms’ attempt to provide
employees with optimal incentives to exert eﬀort. In the light of Proposition 1 they
can be seen as a consequence of investment banks’ competition in the labour market.
Those ﬁrms that oﬀer the steepest hierarchies and the fast track careers attract the
most graduates from top ranked MBA programs.
3.2 All Pay Auctions: r = ∞
We now move on to consider the case r = ∞ where the contests’ outcome is determined
entirely by the players’ eﬀorts. An important example for this type of contest is an
all–pay auction. In an all–pay auction all bidders pay their bids and then the goods are
allocated according to the ranking of bids. In the literature on contest design, all–pay
6“How much am I worth? M&A banker, leading investment bank, Wall Street”, Institutional
Investor Magazine, 2006.
11auctions have been frequently used as a modelling device (see for example Moldovanu
and Sela (2001 and 2006)).
Barut and Kovenock (1998) have characterized the equilibria of an all–pay auction
with identical risk–neutral players and several not necessarily identical prizes. Their
results apply here. If contest i has a single participant, i.e. if Ni = 1, then he will
exert zero eﬀort and win the ﬁrst prize v1
i with certainty. For Ni = 2 the equilibrium
depends on vi. If v1
i = v2
i then both players will exert zero eﬀort and obtain the payoﬀ
v2
i. Otherwise there is a unique equilibrium in which both players choose their eﬀorts
randomly from the interval [0,v1
i − v2
i] and obtain the expected payoﬀ E[Ui
n|Ni] = v2
i.
More generally Barut and Kovenock (1998) show that in a contest with Ni participants






Our next lemma characterizes the players’ equilibrium contest choice for r = ∞.
Lemma 2 Consider the case r = ∞. If vi  = ( 1
N, 1
N,..., 1
N) for some i ∈ {1,2} then
the (v1,v2) entry game has a unique symmetric equilibrium q∗(v1,v2) ∈ (0,1). The
expected number of participants in contest i is strictly larger than in contest j if and
















i ∈ {1,2} then ∆ is strictly decreasing in q with ∆(0) = v1
1 − vN
2 > 0 and ∆(1) =
vN
1 − v1
2 < 0. Hence ∆(q∗) = 0 deﬁnes a unique symmetric equilibrium q∗ ∈ (0,1).
Moreover, q∗ > (<) 1
2 if and only if ∆(1
2) > (<) 0.
Note that when contest 1 chooses to award its entire prize budget to the winner,
it holds that P ∞(v1) − P ∞(v2) < 0 for all v2  = (1,0,...,0). Hence Lemma 2 implies
that for r = ∞ a winner–takes–all contest attracts less participation than any other
contest.
The important question that arises is why, contrary to the case where r = 0, do
players prefer contests that award several prizes when r = ∞? Note that for r = ∞,
competition amongst players is very strong. In order to win a contest a player has
to exert more eﬀort than his rivals and all possible gains in prize money are spent in
12the form of eﬀort costs. Hence players prefer contests that mitigate this competition
by awarding a positive fraction of their prize budget to higher ranks. If players prefer
several prizes to a single ﬁrst prize then we must ask, what is the prize structure that
is most attractive to participants? Our next result characterizes the equilibrium prize
structure for r = ∞.
Proposition 2 Consider the case r = ∞. Let N∗ =
N+1
2 if N is odd and N∗ =
N+2
2 if




N∗ for m = 1,...,N∗ and vm
1 = vm
2 = 0 for m = N∗ + 1,...,N.
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that in equilibrium both contests will choose the prize struc-
ture v∗ that maximizes P ∞(v). Note that for N odd the binomial coeﬃcient (
N−1
m−1)
increases in m for all m < N∗, is maximized at m = N∗, and decreases for all m > N∗.
Hence v∗ is the prize structure that maximizes vN∗
and is as speciﬁed in Proposition
2. The argument for N even is similar.
To understand the intuition for this result consider for example the case where
N = 7. As a contest can always immitate the prize structure of the other contest, in
equilibrium both contests have to expect an equal number of participants. Hence in
equilibrium players enter both contests with equal probability q∗ = 1
2. The likelihood
that a player who enters contest i ﬁnds himself in a contest with m participants ex-
pecting the payoﬀ vm
i is given by 1
26( 6
m−1) and is maximized for m = 4. Hence players
prefer the prize structure which maximizes v4
i and in equilibrium both contests will









Proposition 2 shows that competition for participants is able to explain the use of
multiple, identical prizes. One example where participation is of utmost importance are
TV shows that try to attract telephone participation by its audience. These shows fre-
quently promise a certain number of identical prizes to those participants who manage
to call ﬁrst.
3.3 Imperfectly Discriminating Contests: r ∈ (0,∞)
We now show that the insights we obtained above extend to contests where outcomes
depend on both, players’ eﬀorts and exogenous/random factors. In particular we will
13consider the case r ∈ (0,∞) and show that in equilibrium contests will award multiple
prizes if and only if r is suﬃciently large. To see this suppose that contests award
ﬁrst and second prizes only, i.e. vi = (v1
i,1 − v1
i,0,...,0). If contest i has a single




i. For Ni ≥ 2 each player n ∈ Ni who participates in















A symmetric pure startegy equilibrium can be derived by calculating the ﬁrst order































Note that this equilibrium is unique and it exists if r ≤
Ni
Ni−1.7 Our next result provides
a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which the contest with the steeper prize
structure expects the higher number of participants.
Lemma 3 Suppose that 0 < r ≤ N
N−1 and vi = (v1




In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the (v1,v2) entry game the expected number
of participants in contest 1 is strictly smaller (larger) than in contest 2 if and only if










7It is well known from the literature on rent seeking with a single prize (v1
i = 1) that for r > 1 a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium might fail to exist. See Perez–Castrillo and Verdier (1992) for
details.
14Proof: ∆(q) is strictly decreasing in q with ∆(0) = v1
1 − E[U2
n|N] > 0 and ∆(1) =
E[U1
n|N] − v1
2 < 0. Hence ∆(q∗) = 0 deﬁnes a unique symmetric equilibrium. Note
that ∆(
1

















Hence q∗ < (>) 1
2 if and only if r > (<) ¯ r.
Lemma 3 applies to the important cases where players’ returns to eﬀort are decreas-
ing (r < 1) or constant (r = 1). Whether, in equilibrium, the more competitive contest
1 is more attractive to participants than the less competitive contest 2, depends on the
parameter r. When the contests’ outcome is suﬃciently random (r < ¯ r), contest 1 ex-
pects higher participation than contest 2. On the other hand, when the role played by
players’ eﬀorts in the determination of the contests’ outcome is suﬃciently important
(r > ¯ r) then contest 2 attracts more participants.
To understand the intuition for this result note that players prefer steep prize
structures when they happen to meet few opponents whereas they prefer ﬂat prize
structures when they happen to meet many opponents. A steeper prize structure
raises the pie to be shared when the number of opponents turns out to be low but
leads to stronger competition and hence lower payoﬀs when the number of opponents
turns out to be high. As r increases, the contests’ outcome becomes more sensitive to
changes in players’ eﬀorts thereby increasing competition. Hence when r is suﬃciently
high, players prefer ﬂat prize structures that will mitigate competition.
As the threshold ¯ r is independent of the prize structures v1 and v2, Lemma 3 has
the following implication for the contests’ equilibrium prize structures:
Proposition 3 Suppose that contests cannot award more than two prizes. If r ∈
(0, ¯ r) then in equilibrium both contests will award a single ﬁrst prize, i.e. v∗
1 = v∗
2 =
(1,0,...,0). If r ∈ (¯ r,
N






Proof: See Appendix 1.
15Proposition 3 shows that the equilibrium prize structure depends on the contests’
discriminatory power r. Contests in which the impact of exogenous factors is suﬃciently
important in determining the contest’s outcome (r < ¯ r), tend to award a single ﬁrst
prize while contests whose outcome is determined to a large extent by players’ eﬀorts
(r > ¯ r) will award several identical prizes. In the proof of Proposition 3 contained in
Appendix 1 we show that this result remains valid when contests are allowed to award
more than two prizes. For example when N ≥ 4 and contests are allowed to award
three prizes the equilibrium prize structure is (1,0,...,0) if r < ¯ r, (1
2, 1
2,0,...,0) if






3,0,...,0) if r > ¯ ¯ r where













> ¯ r. (14)
Note that the results of this section remain valid when contests are allowed to pay
players for their attendance. To see this suppose that in an initial stage contests can
approach individual players and oﬀer attendance pay which players can either accept
or reject. After this initial stage the timing is as speciﬁed in Section 2. In the subgame
that starts after each contest has signed up Ns ≤ N
2 players for a total attendance
payment of A ≤ V competition in prize structures will take place as described in
Propositions 1–3 if we substitute N by N − 2Ns and the contests’ prize budget is
reduced to V − A.
In this section we have shown that when contests aim to maximize participation,
competition in prize structures, due to its Bertrand style nature, leads to extreme
outcomes. Contests either implement the winner–takes–all principle or award multiple
identical prizes. In reality, contests are likely to care about factors other than partici-
pation, for example, they may be concerned about players’ aggregate eﬀort. However,
the main mechanism identiﬁed in this section will still be present, such that contests
in which exogenous/random factors play a larger role will tend to implement steeper
prize structures. In Section 6 we provide empirical evidence for this relationship using
data from professional road running.
164 Aggregate eﬀort
Most of the literature on contest design aims to determine the prize structure that
maximizes players’ aggregate eﬀort. While the existing literature assumes that the set
of participants is exogeneously given, our analysis so far indicates that the allocation
of prizes will not only inﬂuence the players’ incentives to exert eﬀort but also their
incentives to participate. In Section 3 we have shown that second and higher order
prizes, although harmful for incentives to exert eﬀort, might increase a contest’s par-
ticipation. As for a given prize structure, aggregate eﬀort is increasing in the number
of participants second prizes might become optimal once participation is endogenous.
To show this more clearly, consider again the case where 0 < r ≤
N
N−1 and suppose
that contest i, oﬀering the prize structure vi = (v1
i,1−v1
i,0,...,0), has attracted Ni ≥ 2














Note that Σei increases in v1
i . That is, for a given number of participants aggregate
eﬀort increases in the fraction of prize budget awarded to the winner. Ex post, once
entry has taken place, aggregate eﬀort would therefore be maximized by awarding a
single ﬁrst prize. This is the standard result of the literature and is not surprising here
as players are identical, risk neutral and have linear costs of eﬀort.
Also note however, that Σei increases in Ni. That is, aggregate eﬀort increases in
the number of participants. If players enter contest 1 with probability q ∈ [0,1] then





































Our analysis in Section 3 has shown that in equilibrium q will depend on the contests’
prize structures. Second prizes therefore have a direct and an indirect eﬀect on ag-
gregate eﬀort. On the one hand, they decrease aggregate eﬀort directly through their
17detrimental eﬀect on incentives to exert eﬀort for a given set of participants. On the
other hand, they inﬂuence expected participation and thereby aﬀect aggregate eﬀort
indirectly. For r < ¯ r the overall eﬀect is immediate. In this case Lemma 3 has shown
that second prizes decrease participation thereby leading to an overall reduction of
expected aggregate eﬀort. However, for r > ¯ r participation is increased by the use of
second prizes and the overall eﬀect might be an increase in expected aggregate eﬀort.
Our next result shows that this is not the case:
Proposition 4 Suppose that 0 < r ≤ N





In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the (v1,v2) entry game expected aggregate eﬀort
is strictly higher in contest 1, i.e. E[Σe1] > E[Σe2].
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Proposition 4 shows that second prizes cannot be used to increase expected ag-
gregate eﬀort. The negative incentive eﬀect of second prizes outweighs the possibly
positive participation eﬀect and the overall eﬀect is a reduction in expected aggregate
eﬀort. Proposition 4 is important as it provides justiﬁcation for the literature’s focus
on an exogeneously given set of participants. It shows that when players are homoge-
neous, risk neutral, and have linear costs of eﬀort, winner–takes–all contests maximize
aggregate incentives even when participation is endogenous.
5 Screening
The screening of workers of diﬀering abilities has been an important theme in the lit-
erature on explicit incentive contracts. For example, Lazear (1986) has shown that
ﬁrms might choose ﬁxed salaries and piece rates in order to screen between workers
of low and high productivity. However, the possibility of screening through compen-
sation schemes that are based on relative performance has so far been ignored by this
literature. Moreover, due to its focus on an exogeneously given set of participants,
screening has not been considered in the literature on contest design. Hence whether
contest organizers might employ steep prize structures in order to attract the most able
participants is still an open question.
18In this section we show that contests might indeed use their prize structure in order
to screen between players of high and low ability. To keep the analysis simple we
consider the case where N = 3 and r = ∞ but we expect our results to hold more
generally.
As before we assume that players are identical ex ante. However, in an initial stage
nature determines whether a player has high or low ability. Both types are equally
likely and abilities are distributed independently across players. A low ability player’s
marginal cost of eﬀort is CL = 1 while for a high ability player it is CH = c ∈ (0,1). A
player’s ability is private information but players learn their rivals’ abilities after they
have entered a contest but before they exert eﬀort.
To see that prize structures might be used to screen players suppose that contest
1 oﬀers a single ﬁrst prize, i.e. vi = (1,0,0) while contest 2 oﬀers two identical prizes,
i.e. v2 = (1
2, 1
2,0). Consider contest 1 and suppose that N1 players have entered. Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) have characterized the equilibria of a single prize all–pay
auction allowing for asymmetries amongst players. Their results apply here. If contest
1 has a single participant, N1 = 1 then he exerts zero eﬀort and wins the ﬁrst prize with
certainty so that E[U1
H|N1] = E[U1
L|N1] = 1. For N1 = 2 there is a unique equilibrium
which depends on the players’ abilities. When players have identical abilities, both
players randomize uniformly over [0, 1
C] and E[U1
H|N1] = E[U1
L|N1] = 0. When players
diﬀer in abilities then E[U1
H|N1] = 1−c and E[U1
L|N1] = 0. Finally for N1 = 3 we have
E[U1
H|N1] = 1−c and E[U1
L|N1] = 0 if one player has high ability and two players have
low ability. Otherwise E[U1
H|N1] = E[U1
L|N1] = 0.
Now consider contest 2 and suppose that N2 players have entered. Clark and Riis
(1998) have characterized the unique equilibrium of an all–pay auction with multiple
identical prizes allowing for asymmetries amongst players.8 If N2 < 3 eﬀort will be




For N2 = 3 the equilibrium depends on players’ abilities. If all players have the same
ability then E[U2
H|N2] = E[U2





We are now prepared to derive the equilibrium in the (v1,v2) entry game. A player’s
8A complete characterization of equilibrium in an all–pay auction with multiple non–idential prizes
and asymmetric players is still to be found. For a ﬁrst step in this direction see Cohen and Sela (2008).
19strategy consists of the probabilities, qH ∈ [0,1] and qL ∈ [0,1], of entering contest 1
conditional on having high or low ability. As players are identical ex ante, we restrict
our attention to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria i.e. we assume that qH and qL are
the same for all players. A low ability player’s expected payoﬀ from entering contest 1
is then given by
U
1




2 denotes a player’s ex ante probability of entering contest 1. Choosing







2 + (1 − qL)q + (1 − qH)q] =
1
2
q(2 − q). (19)
Note that a low ability player’s choice between contest 1 and contest 2 only depends
on the expected total number of rivals determined by q. As low ability players expect
positive payoﬀs only when the number of players in a contest fails to exceed the number
of prizes, their preferences are independent of the distribution of abilities given by qH
and qL. A high ability player’s expected utility from entering contest 1 is given by
U
1
H = (1 − q)























(1 − qH)(1 − qL)]. (21)
Our next result shows that in equilibrium the one prize contest is more attractive to
high ability players than the two prize contest.
Proposition 5 Suppose that N = 3, r = ∞, v1 = (1,0,0) and v2 = (1
2, 1
2,0). In the
unique symmetric equilibrium of the (v1,v2) entry game high and low ability players














Proof: See Appendix 1.
20Proposition 5 suggests that contests might use their prize structure to screen players.
Players sort (partly) according to their abilities. High ability players are more likely to
enter contests with steep prize structures than low ability players. As a consequence
contests which aim to attract the most able players will tend to implement the winner–
takes–all princple. This result is particularly relevant in a labour market setting. It
implies that ﬁrms with steep hierarchies will attract the most productive workers.
6 Empirical Framework
The theory outlined in the previous sections predicts a positive relationship between
the impact of exogenous factors on a contest’s ﬁnal outcome (i.e. the level of random-
ness) and a contest’s competitiveness (i.e. the share of prize budget awarded to the
winner). A similar relationship has been shown to exist in the labor tournament mod-
els of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983). However, while our
theory is based on the contests’ competition for participants, these models focus on the
maximization of players’ aggregate eﬀort. Given that ﬁrms need to attract workers and
provide incentives to exert eﬀort, both aspects can be expected to be present in labor
tournament data. Indeed, using ﬁrm level data, Eriksson (1999) ﬁnds that the disper-
sion of pay between job levels is greater in ﬁrms which operate in noisy environments.
In order to abstract from the competing aspects of these models, we use sports data,
i.e. professional road running, where the provision of incentives to exert eﬀort is less
of an issue then it is in ﬁrm level data. Given their dependence on media interest and
sponsor support, sports contests typically strive to attract the most famous athletes.
Sports data therefore provides the perfect framework to test our theory. Running data
works particularly well as running contests are organised at a disaggregate or “ﬁrm”
level instead of being governed by a federation as it is for example the case for tennis
and golf.
Sports contests tend to be invariably rank ordered and the measurement of in-
dividual performance is generally straight forward, making sports data increasingly
fashionable to test contest theory. Nevertheless, the empirical literature on contest
design is scarce and the few papers that do exist test, whether prize levels and prize
21diﬀerentials have incentive eﬀects. For example, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, b)
use individual player and aggregate event data from US and European Professional Golf
Associations to test whether prizes aﬀect players’ performance. For a recent review of
the literature that uses sports data to test contest theory, see Frick (2003).
There are two papers that share our focus on professional road running. Both
papers seek to test the hypothesis that prize structures aﬀect ﬁnishing times. Maloney
and McCormick (2000) use 115 foot races with diﬀerent distances in the US and ﬁnd
that the average prize and prize spread have negative eﬀects on the ﬁnishing times.
Lynch and Zax (2000) use 135 races and also ﬁnd that ﬁnishing times are faster in
races oﬀering higher prize money. However, Lynch and Zax conclude that the eﬀect
is not due to the provision of stronger incentives but rather a result of sorting of
runners according to abilities. Once ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for, the incentive eﬀect
disappears. This ﬁnding supports our projection that in professional road running, the
provision of incentives to exert eﬀort is less important than the attraction of the most
able runners.
In order to provide empirical evidence for the positive relationship between a con-
test’s level of randomness and its competitiveness, we have collected a dataset contain-
ing 368 road running contests. Road running contests diﬀer in their race course but
are (almost) identical with regard to their organisational set–up. We use the distance
of a race as a measure of race randomness and argue that longer races are more likely
to be aﬀected by exogenous factors (and so have a higher level of randomness) than
shorter races.9
6.1 Race distance as a measure of randomness
There are three strands of support for the assertion that longer races have a higher level
of randomness. Firstly, the longer the race, the stronger the inﬂuence of external factors
(e.g. weather conditions, race course proﬁle, nutrition) on the runners’ performance.
This was evident during the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. In the women’s marathon
the highly acclaimed world recorder holder, Paula Radcliﬀe, was predicted to win.
9To combat the concern that very short races may be quite random as they are often decided by
millisecond diﬀerences, we restrict our analysis to distances of 5km or more.
22However, after a consistent lead, at the 23rd mile mark, Paula stopped and sat crying
on the side path suﬀering the symptoms of heat exhaustion.
Secondly, the longer the race, the less accurate is the estimate of a runner’s abil-
ity based on past performance as longer races are run less frequently. For example,
although it is possible to run a 5km race each week, elite runners typically restrict
themselves to two marathons per year (see Noakes (1985)).
Finally, there exists statistical evidence showing that longer races have a higher level
of randomness than shorter races. This evidence has been kindly provided to us by Ken
Young, a statistician at the “Association of Road Racing Statisticians” (www.arrs.net).
Using a data set containing more than 500,000 performances, Ken Young predicts the
outcome of several hundred road running contests of varying distances between 1999
and 2003. As an example, Table 1 in the Appendix reports his results for the Men’s
races in 1999.10
Two distinct methods were used to predict the winner of a given race. A regression
based handicapping (HA) evaluation attempts to predict each runner’s ﬁnishing time
based on past performance. The predicted time was assumed to be normally distributed
for each runner and the numerical integration yielded the probability that each runner
would win the race. The second method was a Point Level (PL) evaluation based on
a rating system similar to the Elo system in chess or the ATP ranking in tennis, in
which runners take points from runners they beat and lose points to runners they are
beaten by.
Averaging over 274 Men’s races with distances between 5km and 42km, the PL
prediction of the winner was correct in 43% of the “Short” races (distance ≤ 10km),
41% of the “Medium” races (10km < distance < 42km) and 20% of the Long races
(distance ≥ 42km). For the HA prediction the numbers are 45%, 46%, and 21%
respectively. Hence, while Short and Medium distance races are similar in terms of
randomness, Long distance races appear to be much more random.
10The complete set of results is available on http://www.econ.upf.edu/azmat/.
236.2 Data Description
The empirical investigation is done using data on professional road running from the
Road Race Management Directory (2004). This Directory provides a detailed account
of the prize structures, summaries, invitation guidelines, and contacts for almost 500
races. It is an important source of information for elite runners planning their race
season. With the exception of a few, most of the races took place in the United States.
The event listings are arranged in chronological order beginning in April 2004 and
extend through to April 30th 2005. In our analysis we only include races that have at
least $600 in prize money and a race distance greater or equal to 5km, leaving us with
368 races. The Directory provides us with information on the event name, event date,
city, state and previous year’s number of participants. The prize money information
includes the total amount of prize money as well as the prize money breakdown. We
focus on the Men’s races by including only the Men’s prize money distributions.
The Directory contains further information that may inﬂuence runners’ race se-
lection. In particular, it includes data on whether a race was a championship, took
place on a cross country or mountain course, and the race’s winning performance in
the previous year. In order to make ﬁnishing times in races over diﬀerent distances
comparable with each other, we use the Riegel formula (see Riegel (1981)) to calculate
10km equivalent ﬁnishing times.11
Finally, given that the weather conditions play a role in the outcome of an outdoor
race, we collect information on the weather using an internet site called Weatherbase
(www.weatherbase.com). We can get information on the average temperature and
average rainfall in the month that the race takes place.12 Table 2 presents the summary
statistics for three race distance categories: “Short” (distance ≤ 10km); “Medium”
(10km < distance < 42km) and “Long” (distance ≥ 42km). In general, races tend
to be clustered, the most frequent being 5km, 10km, 16km, 21km and 42km. Most
runners specialize and run either Short or Long distance races, while Medium distance
11This formula predicts an athlete’s ﬁnishing time t in a race of distance d on the basis of his
ﬁnishing time T in a race of distance D as t = T( d
D)1.06. It is used by the IAAF to construct scoring
tables of equivalent athletic performances.
12We also collected data on average wind speed. However, the data was incomplete. Our results
remain the same with and without conditioning on the average wind speed.
24races are run by both types.
From the summary statistics in Table 2 we see that there are some obvious dif-
ferences between the three distance categories. In particular, the mean total prize
money (in US$) increases as the distance increases ($2,990, $5,664 and $23,207, re-
spectively).13 The average number of participants also increases with distance (3,359,
5,268 and 5,324, respectively). It is important to note that although the “size” of these
contests increases with distance, typically the number of elite runners is similar.14 In
addition, we do not worry about congestion aﬀects in the populated races because elite
runners will run separately (and typically before) the non-elite runners.
There is consistency in the weather variables when we look across the race types.
In addition, there is a similar probability that the race has a championship status and
the average Riegel measure of performance is almost identical. This is reassuring as it
implies that the “quality” of runners is independent of the race distance.
6.3 Analysis
To obtain estimates for the diﬀerences in prize structure, we estimate the following
compensation equations using 368 men’s races:
Yi = α + βDi + εi. (22)
Yi represents the competitiveness of the prize structure and Di denotes the distance
(and acts as our measure of randomness) for race i. We use various measures of com-
petitiveness Y : (1) a concentration index (C. I.), similar to the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman
index, calculated from the top three prizes, i.e. Y =
(1st)2+(2nd)2+(3rd)2
(1st+2nd+3rd)2 , (2) the ratio
between ﬁrst and second prize, (3) the ratio between ﬁrst and third prize and (4) the
13We use the sum of the top 10 Men’s prizes as the “total prize money”. This variable is more
important for the race choice of elite Men’s runners than the race’s total prize budget as prize money
that is to be distributed to Women’s or Age–group runners is not accessible to them. For comparison
of prize money across countries, we convert all prizes into US dollars using monthly historical exchange
rates for 2004–2005 (www.gocurrency.com).
14Our participation data contains elite and non–elite runners. Unfortunately the number of elite
runners was unavailable. Our participation variable therefore only gives a rough measure for the
popularity of the event amongst elite runners.
25ratio between ﬁrst prize and total prize money. We expect these measures to increase
with the race distance.
For the distance D we use a continuous measure, i.e. a km by km increase in
distance, as well as a comparison between Short, Medium and Long distance races. As
mentioned earlier, races tend to be clustered and so it is more informative to look at
how the prize structure changes when we compare each group. In doing so, we can
estimate the percentage point change in competitiveness when going from Short to
Medium or Long races.
We report the results for all four measures of competitiveness, using the two diﬀerent
distance measures in Table 3. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that as
the distance increases, the prize structure becomes steeper. In particular, using our
concentration index we observe that as the distance of a race increases by 1km, there is
a 0.1% increase in competitiveness. This implies, for example, that the prize structure
of a marathon is almost 4% more concentrated towards the ﬁrst prize than the prize
structure of a 5km race. Similarly, we ﬁnd that when the race changes from being
Short to Long, there is a 3.2% increase in the concentration index. The coeﬃcient of
moving from Short to Medium is positive but insigniﬁcant. This is reassuring, as with
Ken Young’s analysis these races had a similar degree of randomness.
When we look at the other measures of competitiveness, we observe very similar
patterns. In particular, we ﬁnd that as the distance increases, the gap between the
ﬁrst prize and the second or third prize widens. When the distance increases by 1km,
there is a 0.1% rise in the ratio between the ﬁrst and the second or third prize. When
we look across diﬀerent race types, we see that the ratio between the ﬁrst and second
prize increases by 3.0%, while the ratio between the ﬁrst and the third prize increases
by 2.5% when moving from Short to Long. The proportion of total prize money that
goes to the winner also increases with the distance but results are not signiﬁcant.
Next, we extend the analysis of looking at the simple correlation to account for
various factors that may aﬀect runners’ race selection and hence the prize structure.
In particular, we may be concerned that the popularity of a certain race in the world
of running may be important. For example, if the race is a championship race or if
it oﬀers a fast race course (where records can be established) then the race may be
26attractive for elite runners, irrespective of its prize structure. In addition, weather
conditions may play a role. We control for these factors by estimating the following
equation:
Yi = α + βDi + δXi + εi. (23)
X includes average temperature, average rainfall, an indicator identifying whether the
race was a championship, the number of race participants, total prize money, the 10km
Riegel equivalent of the previous edition’s winning time and an indicator for whether
the race is a cross country or a mountain race. It is reassuring to see that the results
remain very similar to the results without controls. In fact, as we can see in Table 4,
the coeﬃcients for all of the prize structure measures and both measures of distance
are almost identical with and without controls.
When we look at the eﬀect that the control variables have on competitiveness, it
is only the average rainfall in the month of the race that has a consistently signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on the spread of prizes. However, neither the signiﬁcance nor the size
of the coeﬃcients have been aﬀected by including controls.
7 Conclusion
The optimal allocation of prizes has been a dominant theme of the recent literature on
contest design. Existing models have determined the prize structure that maximizes
aggregate eﬀort for an exogeneously given set of participants. In this paper we have
allowed the set of participants itself to depend on the contest’s design. In most real
world examples, several contests compete for a common set of potential participants.
As a consequence prizes not only aﬀect players’ incentives to exert eﬀort but also their
incentives to participate.
While the existing literature has struggled to explain the wide spread occurrence
of multiple prizes in our model multiple prizes arise naturally from the contests’ need
to attract participants. We therefore consider our theory as complementary to the one
that focuses exclusively on the provision of incentives.
27Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemma 3 and the fact that ¯ r is independent of the prize
structures v1 and v2. Here we show that the main insight of Proposition 3 remains valid
when contests are allowed to award more than two prizes. In particular, we consider the case
where contests can distribute their prize budget between three prizes. For a higher number
of prizes the proof is similar although more tedious.
Suppose that contest i has chosen the prize structure vi = (v1
i ,v2
i ,v3
i ,0,...,0) and Ni ≥ 3
players participate. Conditional on player l winning the ﬁrst prize and player m winning the




















m|l are as deﬁned in (1) and (2) respectively. Each player n ∈ Ni chooses













A symmetric pure startegy equilibrium can be derived by calculating the ﬁrst order condition






































Note that this equilibrium is unique and it exists if r ≤ Ni
Ni−1. From our earlier analysis
we have E[Ui
n|Ni] = v1







i for Ni = 2. In
equilibrium contest 1 expects a strictly higher (lower) number of participants than contest 2
28if and only if ∆(1
2) > (<) 0 where ∆(q) is as deﬁned in (6). Hence in equilibrium contests
will choose v1, v2 and v3 to maximize Pr(v1,v2,v3) = α(r)v1 + β(r)v2 + γ(r)v3 where
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Note that β(r) > α(r) if and only if r > ¯ r. Moreover γ(r) > β(r) if and only if N ≥ 4 and
r > ¯ ¯ r where ¯ ¯ r is as deﬁned in (14). As Pr is linear in its arguments this implies that in
equilibrium contests will choose v1









N ≥ 4 and r > ¯ ¯ r.
Proof of Proposition 4














m−1 > 0. Hence there exists a unique qe < 1
2 such that δ(qe) = 0.
For r ≤ ¯ r Lemma 3 has shown that q∗(v1,v2) ≥ 1
2 which implies that δ(q∗(v1,v2)) > 0. Hence
suppose that r > ¯ r which implies that q∗(v1,v2) < 1
2. Suppose that all players enter contest
1 with probability qe so that expected aggregate eﬀort is the same in each contest. Some
algebra shows that ∆(qe) > 0 which implies that qe < q∗(v1,v2) and hence δ(q∗(v1,v2)) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1: U1
L − U2
L is strictly decreasing in q with U1
L − U2
L = 0 ⇔ q = 1 − 1 √
3. Suppose that
qL > 2 − 2 √
3. Then q > 1 − 1 √
3 so that low abilities strictly prefer contest 2. Hence in any
equilibrium it has to hold that q∗




H strictly decreases in qL and qH. For qL = 0 we have U1
H − U2
H = 0 ⇔
qH = ¯ qH ≡ 1
3(5 + c −
p
10 + c(1 + c)). In any equilibrium it thus has to hold that qH ≤ ¯ qH.
29¯ qH is strictly increasing in c ∈ (0,1) with limc→1 ¯ qH = 2 − 2 √
3. Hence in any equilibrium
q∗
H < 2 − 2 √
3.
Step 3: Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which qL = 0. From Step 2 it fol-
lows that q =
qH
2 < 1 − 1 √
3. Hence Step 1 implies that U1
L − U2
L > 0, a contradiction. Hence
in equilibrium it has to hold that q∗
L > 0.
Step 4: Step 1 and Step 3 together imply that in any equilibrium low ability players mix
with qL = 2 − 2 √
3 − qH. For qH = 0 and qL = 2 − 2 √
3 one ﬁnds U1
H − U2
H = 5
8(1 − c) > 0.
Hence in any equilibrium it holds that q∗
H > 0.
Steps 1-4 imply that in equilibrium low and high ability players have to be indiﬀerent
between entering contest 1 and entering contest 2. Hence the equilibrium (q∗
L,q∗
H) solves
















30Appendix 2: Empirical Tables
Table 1: Ken Young’s prediction of Men’s winner (1999)
Date Race Name Distance (km) HA Prob HA WP PL CI PL WP
3/5/1999 IAAF World Indoor Champs (JPN) 3.0 80 1 796 1
3/5/1999 NCAA Indoor Champs (IN/USA) 5.0 70 2 398 1
3/6/1999 Gate River Run (FL/USA) 15.0 78 1 434 4
3/6/1999 NCAA Indoor Champs (IN/USA) 3.0 78 1 458 4
3/14/1999 Los Angeles (CA/USA) 42.2 54 2 650 4
3/27/1999 Azalea Trail (AL/USA) 10.0 97 1 432 1
4/11/1999 Cherry Blossom (DC/USA) 16.1 43 3 677 4
4/17/1999 Stramilano (ITA) 21.1 80 1 864 1
4/18/1999 Rotterdam (HOL) 42.2 71 2 709 1
4/19/1999 Boston (MA/USA) 42.2 37 2 727 4
4/25/1999 Sallie Mae (DC/USA) 10.0 66 2 728 1
5/2/1999 Pittsburgh (PA/USA) 42.2 47 1 355 4
5/16/1999 Volvo Midland Run (NJ/USA) 16.1 59 4 376 6
5/16/1999 Bay to Breakers (CA/USA) 12.0 50 3 676 1
5/31/1999 Bolder Boulder (CO/USA) 10.0 25 9 673 13
6/2/1999 NCAA Champs (ID/USA) 10.0 35 5 379 5
6/4/1999 NCAA Champs (ID/USA) 5.0 78 1 456 1
6/12/1999 Stockholm (SWE) 42.2 47 2 433 1
6/19/1999 Grandma’s (MN/USA) 42.2 40 2 392 2
6/27/1999 Fairﬁeld (CT/USA) 21.1 60 6 572 4
7/4/1999 Peachtree (GA/USA) 10.0 68 1 831 2
7/4/1999 Golden Gala (ITA) 5000m 5.0 52 1 1003 1
7/17/1999 Crazy 8’s (TN/USA) 8.0 60 5 714 2
7/25/1999 Wharf to Wharf (CA/USA) 9.7 75 1 673 3
7/31/1999 Quad-Cities Bix (IA/USA) 11.3 88 1 767 1
8/15/1999 Falmouth (MA/USA) 11.3 72 2 845 2
8/21/1999 Parkersburg (WV/USA) 21.1 57 1 338 1
8/24/1999 IAAF World Champs (ESP) 10.0 74 2 960 1
8/28/1999 IAAF World Champs (ESP) 5.0 68 1 992 2
8/28/1999 IAAF World Champs (ESP) 42.2 7 5 699 18
9/3/1999 Ivo Van Damme (BEL) 10.0 42 13 843 12
9/26/1999 Berlin (GER) 42.2 57 1 586 1
10/24/1999 Chicago (IL/USA) 42.2 66 1 752 1
11/7/1999 New York City (NY/USA) 42.2 57 1 702 9
12/5/1999 California International (CA/USA) 42.2 12 8 378 11
Data kindly provided by Ken Young, Association of Road Racing Statisticians. For the handicapping (HA) evaluation,
“HA Prob” denotes the probability with which the predicted winner was expected to win and “HA WP” reports the
placing he actually obtained. Using a Point Level (PL) system the average rating for the ﬁve highest ranked runners
in the race was compared to the average rating for the ten highest ranked runners in the world at the time of the race
in order to construct the competition index (CI). The higher the index the better the quality of the ﬁeld. The column
“PL WP” reports the actual placing obtained by the highest ranked runner.
31Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Short (Distance ≤ 10km)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rain (cm) 175 7.29 3.19 0 17
Temperature (oC) 175 21.44 6.65 3 33
Championship 175 0.07 0.26 0 1
Total (US $) 175 2,989.68 6,389.31 125 60,000
Size 175 3,358.98 7,324.30 18 55,000
Riegel 2003 (Sec) 175 1,821.77 96.91 1,647 2,276
Trail 175 0.01 0.11 0 1
Medium (10km < Distance < 42km)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rain (cm) 97 7.06 2.92 0 16
Temperature (oC) 97 20.27 6.00 0 32
Championship 97 0.12 0.33 0 1
Total (US $) 97 5,664.21 10,011.01 175 70,000
Size 97 5,267.56 10,671.53 100 80,000
Riegel 2003 (Sec) 97 1,849.14 203.44 1,653 3,056
Trail 97 0.05 0.22 0 1
Long (Distance ≥ 42km)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rain (cm) 96 6.49 3.25 0 16
Temperature (oC) 95 18.44 5.13 9 33
Championship 96 0.11 0.32 0 1
Total (US $) 96 23,206.75 46,878.09 225 270,000
Size 96 6,277.22 8,707.80 100 46,000
Riegel 2003 (Sec) 96 1,883.97 180.92 1,629 2,628
Trail 96 0.03 0.17 0 1
Notes: Means and standard deviations for each race distance category, “Short”, “Medium” and “Long”, respectively.
“Championship” refers to whether or not the race held a championship title. “Total” is the total amount of the prize
budget (all values are expressed in real US dollars evaluated at monthly historical exchange rate for 2004-2005). “Size”
refers to the number of contestants in the race. “Riegel 2003” calculates the 10km equivalent race ﬁnishing times.
“Trail” refers to whether the race took place on a cross country or mountain course.
32Table 3: Prize structure without controls
PANEL A
Measures of Competitiveness
Dependent Variable C. I. 1:2 1:3 1:Total
Distance (km) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006
[0.0003]** [0.0002]** [0.0002]** [0.0004]
Constant 0.394 0.6241 0.7321 0.4511
[0.0075]** [0.0058]** [0.0063]** [0.0102]**
Observations 368 368 368 368
PANEL B
Measures of Competitiveness
Dependent Variable C. I. 1:2 1:3 1:Total
Medium 0.0119 0.0115 0.0112 0.0162
[0.0113] [0.0086] [0.0094] [0.0153]
Long 0.0316 0.0299 0.025 0.0245
[0.0113]** [0.0087]** [0.0094]** [0.0153]
Constant 0.3989 0.6292 0.7358 0.4531
[0.0067]** [0.0052]** [0.0056]** [0.0091]**
Observations 368 368 368 368
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (*) and (**) represent signiﬁcance at the 95 and 99 percent level. Omitted
group in Panel B is Short Distance.
33Table 4: Prize structure with controls
PANEL A
Measures of Competitiveness
Dep. Var. C. I. C. I. 1:2 1:2 1:3 1:3 1:Total 1:Total
Dist. 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004
[0.0003]** [0.0003]* [0.0002]** [0.0003]** [0.0002]** [0.0003]* [0.0004] [0.0004]
Rain -0.0059 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.008
[0.0015]** [0.0011]** [0.0012]** [0.0019]**
Temp. 0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0010]
Champ. 0.0006 -0.0034 -0.0039 -0.0206
[0.0156] [0.0121] [0.0131] [0.0203]
Prize 0 0 0 0
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]†
Size 0 0 0 0
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Riegel 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0002
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]† [0.0001]**
Trail -0.0148 -0.0067 -0.0398 -0.0991
[0.0351] [0.0272] [0.0294] [0.0456]*
Const. 0.394 0.302 0.6241 0.6191 0.7321 0.6413 0.4511 0.0984
[0.0075]** [0.0726]** [0.0058]** [0.0562]** [0.0063]** [0.0609]** [0.0102]** [0.0943]
Obs. 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
PANEL B
Measures of Competitiveness
Dep. Var. C. I. C. I. 1:2 1:2 1:3 1:3 1:Total 1:Total
Medium 0.0119 0.011 0.0115 0.0109 0.0112 0.0112 0.0162 0.0163
[0.0113] [0.0112] [0.0086] [0.0087] [0.0094] [0.0094] [0.0153] [0.0145]
Long 0.0316 0.0291 0.0299 0.0289 0.025 0.0233 0.0245 0.0183
[0.0113]** [0.0122]* [0.0087]** [0.0094]** [0.0094]** [0.0102]* [0.0153] [0.0158]
Rain -0.006 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0081
[0.0015]** [0.0011]** [0.0012]** [0.0019]**
Temp. 0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0010]
Champ. 0 -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0215
[0.0156] [0.0121] [0.0131] [0.0203]
Prize 0 0 0 0
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]†
Size 0 0 0 0
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Riegel 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0002
[0.0000]† [0.0000] [0.0000]* [0.0000]**
Trail -0.0163 -0.0092 -0.0424 -0.1021
[0.0351] [0.0273] [0.0295] [0.0456]*
Const. 0.3989 0.3021 0.6292 0.6168 0.7358 0.6389 0.4531 0.096
[0.0067]** [0.0726]** [0.0052]** [0.0564]** [0.0056]** [0.0610]** [0.0091]** [0.0944]
Obs. 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. (†), (*) and (**) represent signiﬁcance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level,
respectively. For description of dependent variables see Table 2.
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